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In this paper, we present a type of media disorder which we call “junk news bubbles” and which 
derives from the effort invested by online platforms and their users to identify and share contents 
with rising popularity. Such emphasis on trending matters, we claim, can have two detrimental 
effects on public debates: first, it shortens the amount of time available to discuss each matter; 
second it increases the ephemeral concentration of media attention. We provide a formal description 
of the dynamic of junk news bubbles, through a mathematical exploration the famous “public arenas 
model” developed by Hilgartner and Bosk in 1988. Our objective is to describe the dynamics of the 
junk news bubbles as precisely as possible to facilitate its further investigation with empirical data. 
From filter bubbles to junk news bubbles  
Much has been written in the last years about online media and the threat of “selective exposure” 
(Sears & Freedman, 1967), “echo chambers” (Garrett, 2009) and “filter bubbles” (Pariser, 2011). The 
argument put forward by communication scholars and observers is that the growing availability of 
information in online media and the perfecting of filtering and recommendation technologies creates 
a “situation in which thousands or perhaps millions or even tens of millions of people are mainly 
listening to louder echoes of their own voices” (Sunstein, 2001, p.16). Reviving a long tradition of 
homophily and segregation models (Schelling, 1971), this idea has sparked much interest in 
computational sociology (cf., among others, Colleoni et al., 2014; Barberá et al., 2015; Quattrociocchi 
et al., 2016; Geschke et al., 2019). Less attention and computational efforts have been dedicated to a 
different type of media bubbles whose danger comes not from the fragmentation, but from the 
ephemeral concentration of public attention, in a way that reminds the economic bubbles of 
financial speculation. Though less studied, these “junk news bubbles" are as dangerous and possibly 
more dangerous than the filter bubbles (whose impacts may have been overestimated, cf. Flaxman 
et al. 2016 and Dubois, 2018). 
We introduced the term “junk news” in a previous paper (Venturini, 2019) as a replacement for the 
notion of “fake news” and its excessive focus on deceitfulness (cf., among others, Wardle & 
Derakhshan, 2017; Zuckerman, 2017; Benkler et al., 2018; Gray et al. 2020). Fabricated news, we 
argued, are less prevalent and less dangerous than the avalanche of memes, click-baits, trolling 
provocations and other forms of distractions that prevent online audiences from engaging in a 
thoughtful public debate. In this paper, we propose a more precise characterization of junk news 
based on a feature that is often neglected when considering online misinformation – its distinctive 
temporal profile. In this paper, we thus define junk news as an adverse media dynamic in which large 
shares of public attention are captured by items that are incapable of sustaining it for a long time. 
Central in the ‘70s and ‘80s, the question of “attention cycles” (Downs, 1972) has lost steam in 
current media research because of the advent of digital technologies and the extension of the media 
system that they brought with them. Because of such extension, the question of the occupation of 
public debate has begun to be formulated in spatial rather than in temporal terms (i.e. where 
something is discussed rather than when). Temporal dynamics, however, remains crucial for, as in 
the words of McLuhan, “the ‘message’ of any medium or technology is the change of scale or pace or 
pattern that it introduces into human affairs... amplif[ying] or accelerate[ing] existing processes” 
(McLuhan, 1964, p.8). As noted by scholars working on attention economy (Lanham, 20066; 
Terranova, 2012; Crogan & Kinsley, 2012), digital technologies are particularly inclined to amplify 
“media hype” (Vasterman, 2005). Such a partiality for trendiness can be found in the practices of 
social media users, which are increasingly driven by micro-celebrity strategies (Marwick & Boyd, 
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2011; Khamis et al. 2017) and vanity metrics (Rogers, 2018). It can also be found in their machine-
learning recommendation algorithms and their tendency to reinforce user behaviors (Cardon, 2005; 
Cardon et al., 2018), particularly when in line with the business model of online advertisement 
(Braun & Eklund, 2019). As candidly admitted by YouTube engineers: “in addition to the first-order 
effect of simply recommending new videos that users want to watch, there is a critical secondary 
phenomenon of boot-strapping and propagating viral content” (Covington et al.,2016 p.193, see also 
Zhao et al., 2019). 
This paper’s goal is to provide a formal description of these attention dynamics in order to encourage 
their further study. With a few remarkable exceptions (see in particular Leskovec, Backstrom & Lars, 
2009 and Lorenz-Spreen et al., 2019), no large-scale empirical research has been devoted to 
attention cycles, despite the growing availability of traces produced by digital media (Lazer et al., 
2009; Latour et al, 2012; Venturini, Jensen & Latour, 2015). To facilitate such research, we propose a 
mathematical formalization of one of the most influential accounts of attention dynamics: the 
“public arenas model” introduced in 1988 by Stephen Hilgartner and Charles Bosk. Despite its clarity 
and insightfulness, H&B’s framework has so far found no mathematical formalization for its 
complexity and lack of formal description. In this paper, we streamline H&B’s model focusing on the 
rise and fall of attention matters (and ignoring the linkages across different arenas and the actors 
within each arena). Doing so we propose a ready-to-test (prêt-à-tester) version of H&B s model 
hoping that it will encourage further empirical investigation on junk news bubbles. 
Model description 
(a) The first ingredient of our model is a population of “matters of attention” (or “social problems” 
as in H&B original formulation) defined self-referentially as the entities that compete to capture 
public attention. The non-essential nature of this definition is crucial for H&B, who contend that 
“social problems are projections of collective sentiments rather than simple mirrors of objective 
conditions” (H&B p.54). In other words, matters of attention are defined by their visibility and not 
the other way around (“we define a social problem as a putative condition or situation that is labeled 
a problem in the arenas of public discourse and action” p.55). Three corollaries descend from this 
non-essentialist definition: 
● First, all attention matters are equal before our model and that their rise and fall depend 
exclusively on the competition between them and not on any substantial features (“social 
problems exist in relation to other social problems” p.55). 
● Second, our model focuses on attention dynamics internal to media arenas, deliberately 
disregarding the influence of exogenous shocks. This does not mean, of course, that these 
shocks do not exist (clearly the breaking of a war or of an earthquake will command 
attention in all attention arenas). Yet, their influence is both classic (Crane & Sornette, 2008) 
and insufficient to account for all media dynamics can (“if a situation becomes defined as a 
social problem, it does not necessarily mean that objective conditions have worsened. 
Similarly, if a problem disappears from public discourse, it does not necessarily imply that 
the situation has improved” p.58). This is particularly true of the kind of junk news we are 
interested in, which may occasionally surf the drama of external events, but is more often 
entirely self-referential. For these reasons, exogenous shocks are deliberately excluded from 
our model (but empirical applications should, of course, control for them). 
● Third and similarly to H&B framework, our model can be applied to different media and at 
different scale. Attentions matters are broadly defined as recognizable units of content in a 
particular forum of collective debate (the attention arena). Examples could be different 
videos in a given YouTube channel or different threads in a given Reddit subreddit. To be 
sure, we are not promising that our model will fit to all media debate but inviting scholars to 
test it empirically on different phenomena to determine to which it can be fruitfully applied. 
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(b) The second ingredient of our model are two competition mechanisms that favor some attention 
matters over others. The four different “principles of selection” distinguished by H&B find in our 
model a formalization in two main mechanisms: 
● Exogenous influences. Three of the four “principles of selection” distinguished by H&B, 
“drama” (pp.61-62), “culture and politics” (H&B p.64) and “organizational characteristics” 
(pp. 65,66) are rendered in a deliberately coarse way in our model. The dramatic value of 
attention matters as well as the way in which they resonate with the general culture or with 
the specific organization of the medium are important, but their influence falls outside the 
self-induced media dynamics that constitute the focus of our model. In our formalization, the 
influence of these features is thus rendered as a noise which randomly increases or 
decreases the visibility of each item at each iteration. This solution allows to account for this 
type of influence (and to explore the effect of its variation) under the assumption that its 
specific nature does not affect the dynamic of junk news bubble. 
● Endogenous trending. The last selection principle identified by H&B, “novelty and 
saturation”, is crucial to our model. At each iteration, the model increases or decreases the 
visibility of each matter, repeating its previous variation, multiplied by a parameter that 
accelerates or decelerates such variation. The model therefore rewards rising items and 
penalizes declining ones. This mechanism works as a Matthew effect (Merton, 1968 and 
Newman, 2001), but a dynamic one which rewards not the most visible matters, but the ones 
that have increased the most since the previous iteration. This boosting of trendiness is 
consistent with the way in which online platforms “emphasiz[e] novelty and timeliness… [by] 
identifying unprecedented surges of activity” and “reward[ing] popularity with visibility” 
(Gillespie, 2016, p.55&60). Such partiality for trendiness is characteristic of both social media 
and their users, in a sociotechnical loop in which the visibility granted by platform algorithms 
both depends on and is influenced by the number of views generated by different contents. 
(c) The third ingredient of our model are the attention boundaries. At each iteration, after adding (or 
subtracting) to each attention matter its random variation and its trending acceleration, the model 
corrects the potential visibility of each item to make sure that it remains within two inflexible 
boundaries: 
● Lower boundary: exclusion of negative visibility. Because it is impossible to conceptualize 
such thing as a negative attention, when noise or acceleration push the visibility of a matter 
of attention below zero, the item is removed from the arena and replaced with a new one 
with null initial visibility. Because a new attention matter can enter the arena only when old 
one leaves it, the number of items in the model remains fixed (but some items can have 
visibility equal to zero). 
● Upper boundary: saturation of the attention capacity. After having applied noise and 
acceleration and corrected for negative attention, the model divides the potential visibility of 
each items by the sum of the potential visibilities of all items. This normalization makes sure 
that the sum of all computed visibilities remains equal to one. This boundary implements a 
key ingredient of H&B framework, the idea that each debate arena has a fixed attention 
capacity. (or “carrying capacity”, in H&B terms). The fixity of the global “carrying capacity” is 
crucial to ensure that our model does not converge to a trivial winner-takes-all equilibrium. 
While raising attention matters are pushed to an increasing visibility by their trendiness, they 
all end up reaching a point where they exhausted their potential for growth, begin to slow 
down and are penalized by competition mechanisms. 
The inelasticity of attention capacity also ensures that the visibility gained by one matter of 
attention is always lost by some other so that “the ascendance of one social problem will… 
be accompanied by the decline of one or more others” (H&B p.61). While we are, of course, 
aware that public attention fluctuates with circadian and professional rhythms, we believe 
that these cyclical fluctuations can be discounted for the sake of simplicity. Following H&B, 
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we think that good reasons for a fixed attention capacity can be found in the limited staging 
capacity of media (“the prime space and prime time for presenting problems publicly are 
quite limited” p.59) and, more importantly, in the limited capacity of the public to attend to 
public (“members of the public are limited not only by the amount of time and money they 
can devote to social issues, but also by the amount of ‘surplus compassion’ they can muster 
for causes beyond the usual immediate concerns” p.59). While, others (see for example, 
Cinelli et al., 2019) takes these limitations as a reason for selective exposure and filter 
bubbles, we believe that they are a crucial ingredient of ephemeral concentration and fake 
news bubbles. 
Model formulation and parameters 
(a) We call 𝑥!  each item of our population of matters of attention, with 𝑖	 = 	1, . . . , 𝑁, where 𝑁is the 
maximum number of items in the population. We call "visibility" or 𝜋"!  the share of attention 
captured by 𝑥! 	at time 𝑡. By a mechanism explained below, at each timestep, the sum of 𝜋"!  for all 𝑖 
is fixed and equal to one. This allow, without loss of generality, to interpret each	𝜋"!  as the 
percentage of the total attention captured by each item 𝑖 at time 𝑡 
 (b) We model the two competition mechanisms as follows:  
● Endogenous trending. At every timestep 𝑡 + 1, the visibility  𝜋"#$!  of each item 𝑖 is modified 
by adding to its current visibility 𝜋"!  a term which repeat its previous variation (i.e. 𝛥𝜋 =𝜋"!- 𝜋"%$!) multiplied by a positive factor 𝛼, which could be interpreted as a boost of 
trendiness. 
● Exogenous influences. In our formalization, we render all external influences on media 
dynamics as a noise 𝜀"!which increase or decrease the visibility of item 𝑖 randomly at 
timestep 𝑡. The noise  𝜀"!  is a realization of a normal distribution  𝑁(0, !"∗$!) with mean = 0 and standard deviation = $√'( 
where c is a positive parameter. We can therefore write the potential visibility of each item 
after the iteration 𝑝"#$!  as the output of the two above mechanisms as follows: 	𝑝"#$!	: = 	𝜋"! + 	𝛼(𝜋"!	 − 𝜋"%$!) 	+ 𝜀"! 	 (1) 
(d) At each iteration 𝑡, the potential visibility  𝑝"#$!	is replaced with its corrected version 𝑝4	"#$!  to 
abide by the model's attention boundaries:  
● Exclusion of negative visibility.  𝑝4	"#$!  equals 𝑝"#$!  if 𝑝"#$!is positive. Otherwise it is set to 
zero. Hence,  
 𝑝4	"#$! 	= 	𝑚𝑎𝑥(0, 𝑝"#$!) (2) 
● Saturation of the attention capacity. The limited capacity of an arena is represented by the 
constraint of having a fixed sum of popularities at each timestep. Therefore, each visibility is 
obtained from the non-negative 𝑝4	"#$!  by normalization. 
 	𝜋"#$!	 = 	 𝑝*	𝑡+1𝑖∑𝑗 𝑝*	𝑡+1𝑗  (3) 
Initialization. At the first step of the model, the visibility of every 𝑖 (i.e. 𝜋$!) is initialized with a 
random numbers drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 and normalized to satisfy the 
constraint  ∑! 𝜋$! = 	1. At the second step, the visibility every 𝑖 (i.e. 𝜋,!) is obtained by adding to 
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𝜋$! 	a noise 𝜀"!  drawn from the normal distribution 𝑁(0, !"∗$!) and normalizing. After the first two 
steps, the dynamics is self-sustained by evaluating equations (1), (2) and (3) at each iteration. 
Inspecting the equations above, it is easy to observe that our model has only three parameters: 
● 𝛼, trendiness boost, which decides whether the visibility variation at the previous iteration is 
amplified at the next one and by how much, is the key parameter of our simulation. 
Conceptually, 𝛼 can be interpreted as the keenness of media algorithms and media users to 
identify and promote trendy matters of attention. The bigger is 𝛼, the more important is the 
role played by trendiness in the sociotechnical choices that influence the visibility of media 
items. High values of trendiness boost thus simulates the attention dynamics occurring in 
debate arenas prone to junk news bubbles. 
● The other two parameter are 
○ 𝑛, which represent the maximum number of attention matters simultaneously 
present in the simulation,  
○ and 𝑐, which represent the size of noise, that is to say the importance of exogenous 
influences. 
Both 𝑛 and 𝑐 are used in the realization of noise and, because they appear in the 
denominator of the distribution that generate noise, the higher they are, the smaller are the 
variations due to noise. 
Model results and discussion 
Despite its simplicity, our model is able to generate patterns comparable with the empirical 
observations of media systems (Leskovec, Backstrom & Lars, 2009; Lorenz-Spreen, 2019). In 
particular, our formalization supports the H&B intuition that the “shifting waves of social problems” 
(H&B p.67) typical of media attention cycle can be explained by the interaction between the push of 
trendiness and the saturation of the carrying capacity: “if we explore these complex linkages, we find 
a huge number of positive feedback loops, ‘engines’, that drive the growth of particular problems. 
Growth is constrained, however, by the negative feedback produced by the finite carrying capacities 
of the public arenas, by competition among problems for attention, and by the need for continuous 
novel drama to sustain growth” (H&B p.67). 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of our model for trendiness boost = 0, 1, 2, and 3 (with 𝑛 = 20 and 𝑐 = 12). Only 
the first 100 iterations are shown as the shape of the curves does not change in further iterations 
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The comparison between the graphs in fig. 1 suggests that, as the boost of trendiness grows, the rise 
and fall of attention matters becomes steeper. This relation can be tested by computing the mean 
steepness of attention curves (the absolute increase or decrease by unit of time) and observing that 
it increases monotonically at the increase of alpha before reaching a plateau (probably due to the 
upper and lower boundaries of our model and to impossibility of compressing the width of curve 
beyond a certain point).  
 
Figure 2. Mean slope of attention curves as function of the trendiness boost 
(for different values of n and c) 
Fig.2 confirms that the relation between the steepness of attention curve and trendiness boost is not 
substantially transformed by the other parameters of our model. The number of attention matters 
and the importance of exogenous influences shift the position of the curve, but do not change its 
shape. Also, because both 𝑛 and 𝑐 affect the curve in the same way, only 𝑛 will be explored in the 
next figures. 
Considering together fig. 1 and 2, it is also interesting to notice that trendiness boost increases rise-
and-fall steepness affecting both dimensions of the media cycle: the height of attention curves and 
their width. This suggests that junk news bubbles may combine consequences which may appear 
contradictory. 
● Regardless of the number of items or the level of noise, the stronger is trendiness boost the 
shorter is the lifecycle of individual attention matters (fig.3a). Remarkably, this is true for all 
attention matters: even items that reach very high levels of visibility end up falling as quickly 
as they rose. As a consequence of the shortening of attention weaves, a higher number of 
matters enter and exit the arena (fig.3b). Arguably, this may be the reason why online 
platforms are partial to trendiness: as the barriers to content production lower and volume 
of content grows, boosting trendiness is an effective way to fit more items in the same 
attention span.  
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Figure 3. (a) Mean length of attention matters’ life cycle and (b) ratio of new attention matters 
entering the model in its first 10.000 iterations, at the variation of trendiness boost 
(for different values of n and with c set to 12) 
● On the other hand, higher trendiness boost increase the maximum visibility reached by 
attention matters (fig. 4a) and, most importantly, amplify the difference between successful 
and unsuccessful attention matters, creating a situation in which, at each iteration, most of 
the available attention is captured by a minority of over-visible items (fig. 4b). “There is a 
huge ‘population’ of potential problems-putative situations and conditions that could be 
conceived of as problems. This population, however, is highly stratified. An extremely small 
fraction grows into social problems with ‘celebrity’ status… [while] the vast majority of these 
putative conditions remain outside or on the extreme edge of public consciousness” (H&B p. 
57). 
 
Figure 4. (a) Mean height of the attention curve peaks and (b) Gini index of attention concentration at 
each iteration of the model, at the variation of trendiness boost 
(for different values of n and with c set to 12) 
Conclusion 
Taken alone, none of the consequences of junk news bubbles highlighted by our model is particularly 
surprising: being an acceleration, trendiness predictably shortens the lifespan of attention matters 
and, being a positive feedback, it increases their maximum visibility. Their combination, however, is 
remarkable as it creates a shoaling of attention waves which reduces the width and increases the 
height of attention curves. Debate arenas characterized by a stronger focus on trendiness may 
therefore end up displaying a syncopated rhythm of attention that is at the same time increasingly 
dispersed and increasingly concentrated (as one can easily observe, for example, in YouTube 
channels or subreddits devoted to buzzing news, memes and viral contents). 
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Being a simplified formalization of a relatively abstract framework, our mathematical model does not 
allow substantial claims about actual attention dynamics. It allows, however, to advance a precise 
hypothesis about the junk news bubbles and their detrimental effects on public debate: the 
fascination with trendiness of digital platforms and their users may create an over-accelerated public 
debate in which a disproportionate share of media attention is captured by matters which are 
incapable to sustain it. As the shoaling of sea waves is associated with the entering in shallower 
waters, so junk news bubbles may be associated with a shallower public debate, a risk that we 
believe is as serious as the fragmentation produced by filter bubbles, if not more. 
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